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BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE OR SIMPLY
ROLLING THE DICE:
A COMMENT ON SECTION 621 OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
By Joshua R. Rosenthal*
ABSTRACT
Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act modifies the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any
affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial
product from betting against that very product for one year after the
product’s initial sale. The rule prohibits anyone who structures or
sells an asset-backed security or a product composed of asset-backed
securities from going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they
have sold, and labels such transactions as presenting material
conflicts of interest. This Comment discusses traces this new law’s
development through the Financial Crisis by recounting the events
involving alleged material conflicts of interest that gave rise to
Section 621’s drafting as well as statements of its drafters. The
Comment then argues that adding a disclosure exemption to Section
621 via the corresponding SEC regulation implementing it would be
preferable to an outright prohibition because a disclosure exemption
would 1) be more consistent with the securities laws; 2) provide
purchasers with sufficient protection while still allowing the markets
to operate with limited restriction; and 3) allow buyers to price the
risk of securities affected by material conflicts of interest.

INTRODUCTION
Section 621 (“Section 621”) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or the “Dodd-Frank Act”)
modifies the Securities Act of 1933 to prohibit the underwriter,
placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or
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subsidiary of any such entity of an asset-backed financial product from
betting against that very product for one year after the product’s initial
sale.1 The rule prohibits anyone who structures or sells an asset-backed
security (“ABS”) or a product composed of asset-backed securities from
going short, in the specified timeframe, on what they have sold.2 This
runs counter to the established principles of the the federal securities
laws, which focus primarily on disclosure and include few per se bans
on transactions.3
In the midst of the Financial Crisis, the SEC and Congress launched
investigations focused on alleged misdeeds by one of Wall Street’s
biggest players, Goldman, Sachs & Co (“Goldman”).4 At the core of the
government’s interest in Goldman lay several structured financial
products. Among those products was “ABACUS 2007-AC1,” a highly
controversial offering because it referenced a portfolio of subprime
residential mortgage backed securities chosen by a party that went short,
or bet against, that same referenced portfolio.5 At the same time,

*J.D. 2012, Fordham Law School; A.B. 2007, Brown University. I am truly grateful to
my wife, Kate, for all her support and advice. Likewise, I am most appreciative of my
parents. Throughout this entire process, Professor Richard Scott Carnell has been
nothing short of an amazing and inspiring mentor. I am indebted to him for all his help.
Likewise, I must thank Professors Russell Pearce, Douglass Seidman, Marcella
Silverman, and Elizabeth Maresca for all their guidance over the past two years. Their
dedication has greatly improved my legal writing, and I cannot thank them enough.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631-32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a). In
the wake of the Financial Crisis, Congress drafted Dodd-Frank for the following
purposes: “[1] to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, [2] to end ‘too big to fail’, [3]
to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [4] to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” Id. at preamble.
2. Id. at 1632.
3. See infra Part V.
4. See infra Part III.
5. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 2010) [hereinafter Abacus Complaint]; STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG.,
WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 318639 (Comm. Print 2011), [hereinafter ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE], available
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.
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Goldman structured and sold a series of similar products that the
institution itself shorted.6 Alarmed, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan and
Senator Jeffrey Merkley of Oregon labeled such deals as “Designed to
Fail,” and drafted Section 621 in response.7
From their understanding of Goldman’s alleged misdeeds, Section
621’s authors argue that assembling asset-backed securities and selling
them should require heightened duties to one’s clients because such
assemblers have extraordinary “control over whether a security is
intended to succeed or fail.”8 Despite this potential for control, the
securities laws already provide sufficient remedies for those damaged by
such assemblers and thus, provide incentives against such misdeeds.9
By enacting Section 621, Congress, in essence, responded “No” to
the following question: Would you allow someone to live in a house
where the house’s electrician had an insurance policy that rewarded him
in the event the building were to burn down?10
Now, consider the following question: Is it illegal or unacceptable
for a casino11 to set odds on the outcome of a sports game, take bets
from gamblers and then profit from the spread of odds and the losses
incurred by the gamblers? No, because it is expected that casinos will
set odds in their favor (and no one forces the gambler to wager his
money) and the gambler is privy to the same information that the casino
has. In the end, the casino will only profit if the gambler fails, yet this is

*I take no position on the veracity of all allegations discussed in this Comment. For the
purposes of this Comment, I treat all such accusations as true solely for the purpose of
illustrating the types of activity that Section 621 is designed to prevent.
6. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 9.
7. Jeffrey Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats,
48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 523 (2011) [hereinafter Policy Essay].
8. Id. at 549-50.
9. See infra Part V.
10. 156 CONG. REC. S4057 (May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley);
156 CONG. REC. S5894 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (making a
similar comparison using a mechanic who fixes a car’s brakes while simultaneously
taking out a life insurance policy against the life of the car’s driver).
11. For an interesting analysis comparing and applying securities regulation of
structured financial products to gambling laws, see Christopher B. Chuff, Comment,
“Rolling the Dice” on Financial Regulatory Reform: Gambling Law as a Framework
for Regulating Structured Investments, 18 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 569 (2011).
In the United States, investments are more leniently regulated than gambling. Id. at 613.
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perfectly acceptable because the gambler is aware of the risk assumed
and because the gambler understands that the casino is on the other side
of the wager.
The securities laws, the essence of which is fundamentally
disclosure, function much like the casino question because the securities
laws place a premium on both sides having equal information and do not
focus on categorically restricting transactions.12 This comment examines
existing principles of disclosure and fraud in the securities laws to show
why Section 621 is overly restrictive and runs counter to general
conceptions of securities regulation. With proper disclosure and existing
remedies for fraud and misstatements, there is little reason to restrict a
buyer from purchasing a product even when the product’s structurer or
seller stands to profit from its demise.13
In Part I, the text and meaning of Section 621 are examined. Part II
examines four transactions arranged by Goldman and their effect on the
drafters of Section 621. Through statements made by Senators Merkley
and Levin and a review of the government’s investigations and
allegations against Goldman, the transactions’ profound influence on
Section 621 are highlighted. Part III examines the legislative history of
Section 621, part of the Merkley-Levin Provisions, and further
reinforces how much Goldman’s alleged misdeeds influenced the
substance of Section 621. Part IV reviews the existing securities laws in
light of their emphasis on disclosure. In Part IV, this Comment argues
that the categorical ban found in Section 621 is not consistent with the
fundamentals of disclosure because the securities laws are premised not
on the underlying quality or characteristics of securities, but rather are
focused on ensuring that investors receive adequate information about
those securities. Finally, Part V outlines this Comment’s ultimate
recommendation: the creation of a disclosure exemption to Section 621
which would be included in the SEC rule implementing Section 621.
This Park argues that an outright right ban on the sale or distribution of
securities affected by material conflicts of interest is not preferable to a
simple disclosure requirement because: 1) the markets exist in part for
parties to take opposite positions and material conflicts of interest do not
alter this fact; 2) adequate disclosure will facilitate investment, despite
the existence of material conflicts of interest; and 3) buyers will price

12.
13.

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part VI.A
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risk associated with material conflicts of interest into agreements. From
there, this Part discusses ways a disclosure requirement or exemption
could be created, ultimately recommending that SEC Rule 127B, the
rule that will regulate Section 621 now being explored and drafted by
the SEC, contain a disclosure exemption.14 This recommendation is
based on the SEC’s authority to create exemptions and because this
avenue offers a more streamlined and efficient way of adding the
exemption when compared to the alternatives.
I. TEXT AND MEANING OF SECTION 621
Section 621 adds Section 27B to the Securities Act of 1933.15 It
provides:
An underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or
any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-backed
security (as such term is defined in section 78c of this title, which for
the purposes of this section shall include a synthetic asset-backed
security), shall not, at any time for a period ending on the date that is
one year after the date of the first closing of the sale of the assetbacked security, engage in any transaction that would involve or
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor
16
in a transaction arising out of such activity.

It goes on to create three exemptions from this general prohibition:
1) risk mitigating or hedging activities arising out of the underlying
security; 2) liquidity commitments involving the underlying security;
and 3) bona fide market making for the security’s sale.17
Section 621’s authors explain that their intention in drafting the
prohibition with the term “material conflict of interest” is essentially to
block the structurer or seller of an asset-backed security (or synthetic

14. See SEC Proposed Rule on Conflicts of Interest, SEC (Sept. 19, 2011)
[hereinafter SEC Proposed Rule 127B], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed
/2011/34-65355.pdf. The current draft of SEC Rule 127B solicits comments about a
possible disclosure exemption but contains no such exemption. Id. at 89-95.
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631-32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a).
16. Id. § 621(a).
17. Id. § 621(c).
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equivalent) from taking a short position on that same security.18 They
make it clear that such short positions are banned, explicitly noting that
disclosure of such a short position is not adequate to mend the conflict
of interest.19 This Comment argues that a disclosure exemption is not
only appropriate, but preferable to any outright prohibition of
transactions affected by material conflicts of interest.
II. THE GOLDMAN CDOS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SECTION 621
The four structured financial products sold by Goldman discussed
is Subparts A and B (the “Goldman CDOs”) became the hallmarks of
the need for Section 621 in the eyes of Congress. Indeed, these specific
Credit Default Obligation (“CDO”) products are referenced and
admonished throughout the legislative history of Section 621 and again
when Section 621’s authors lauded their work’s final passage into law.
To understand how the drafters of Section 621 viewed Goldman’s
actions and the profound effect those actions had on the drafters, this
Part focuses on the Goldman CDOs’ treatment in: 1) a report by the
Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,20 chaired by
Senator Levin; 2) various statements and writings by Senators Merkley
and Levin; as well as 3) the SEC’s litigation against Goldman and
Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman Sachs vice president, who helped structure

18. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 549 (“A firm that underwrites an assetbacked security would run afoul of the provision . . . if it takes the short position in a
synthetic asset-backed security that references the same assets it created because this
results in the firm essentially betting against assets that it previously packaged.”) (citing
156 CONG. REC. S2599 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin));
Regulation Developments 2010, 66 BUS. LAW. 665, 726 (2011) (“The legislative history
of section 621 indicates that Congress intended to address blatant conflicts of interest in
which an underwriter or sponsor creates an [asset-backed security] that is designed to
fail and then profits by betting against it, by means of short sales or otherwise.”)
(quotations omitted).
19. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 550 (“Even a disclosure to the purchaser of the
underlying asset-backed security that the underwriter has—or might in the future—bet
against that asset will not cure the material conflict of interest.”); Letter from Senators
Jeffrey Merkley & Carl Levin to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, et al. (Aug. 3, 2010)
(“[T]he utility of disclosures must be carefully examined, and not be seen as a cure for
the conflicts.”) [hereinafter Merkley-Levin Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/co
mments/df-title-vi/conflicts-of-interest/conflictsofinterest-2.pdf.
20. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5.
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Abacus.21 This treatment shows that, in large part, Section 621 is a
reaction to the outrage at Goldman’s practices in developing and selling
the CDOs explored in this Comment, and details the government’s
accusations of fraud and misstatements against Goldman. In viewing
these transactions, it seems that Goldman’s misdeeds stem more from
non-disclosure or misstatements concerning conflicts of interest than the
underlying conflicts.
A. ABACUS 2007-AC1 (“ABACUS”)
In 2006 and early 2007, Goldman began developing and issuing
investments in Abacus, a $2 billion synthetic CDO referencing mid and
subprime residential mortgages that were rated BBB at the time they
were selected for inclusion in the deal.22 Abacus was unique among the
Goldman CDOs examined here because Goldman allowed a third party
client, hedge fund Paulson & Co. (“Paulson”), to pick the underlying
mortgages.23 Not only that, but the entire CDO was, according to
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse and the SEC, arranged at Paulson’s
request.24
Paulson, convinced that subprime mortgages were overvalued and
that many of them were destined to fail, sought to take positions where it
could capitalize in the event of major defaults in the subprime market.25
As one of Goldman’s largest clients in the residential mortgage-backed
securities (“RMBS”) arena, Paulson had tremendous sway with
Goldman.26 At the same time, the SEC’s Complaint against Goldman
and Tourre goes on to allege that Goldman “recognized that market
conditions were presenting challenges to the successful marketing of
CDO transactions backed by mortgage-related securities.”27 Paulson

21. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16,
2010).
22. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 395.
23. Id. at 396. The report characterizes this activity as allowing the third party, here
Paulson, to “rent” the CDO because its actual structure is set up by Goldman, which
also markets the CDO to clients. Id.
24. Id.; Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 3.
25. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396; Abacus Complaint,
supra note 5, ¶ 15-17.
26. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396.
27. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 18; Logically, this allegation makes much
sense to include in the Complaint. First, it allows the SEC to show that Goldman was
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approached Goldman in mid to late 2006 looking for an opportunity to
short a portfolio of RMBS that Paulson itself could select.28 The SEC
alleged that Goldman and Tourre knew that disclosing Paulson’s level of
involvement with the selection of the underlying assets and its short
position on layers within the overall CDO would make Abacus a tough
sell to investors seeking to go long on the CDO.29 To remedy this issue
and remove Paulson from the face of Abacus, Goldman or Paulson
sought out a third party portfolio selection agent, eventually hiring ACA
Management LLC (“ACA”).30 ACA’s involvement then would mask
Paulson’s role in Abacus and additionally, bolster Abacus’s credibility
with investors by making it seem as though the underlying assets in the

cognizant of the difficulties presented by going long on subprime mortgages and thus
the difficulties in finding anyone willing to buy such positions without getting into the
CDO activities Goldman undertook to short that subprime securities for its own
accounts, which would be too much of a frolic and detour in a relatively pithy
complaint. Second, it details an extra incentive for Goldman to hire ACA, discussed
below, in an attempt to cover up Paulson’s involvement in the selection process because
again it shows that Goldman realized how difficult it would be to sell these investments
generally let alone with a likely-biased hedge fund selecting the underlying assets.
Third, it allowed the SEC to introduce the world to “Fabulous” Fabrice Tourre by
quoting and thereby publicizing tête-à-tête emails where Tourre describes the
destruction the “exotic” CDOs caused while admitting he himself never quite
understood them: “More and more leverage in the system, The whole building is about
to collapse anytime now . . . . Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre] . . .
standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created
without necessarily understanding all of the implications of those monstruosities
[sic]!!!” Id. Tourre’s now infamous emails were quoted widely, making Tourre a poster
boy for the bankers who contributed to the Financial Crisis. See, e.g., Dana Milbank,
Wall Street’s Mr. Fabu-Less, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2010, at A02; Hugo Dixon &
Richard Beales, Major Distraction Hinders Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at
B2.
Citing the same email, ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE argues “Goldman
did not view any of the four CDOs examined in this Report [including Abacus] as
sound investments for the clients to whom it sold the securities.” Supra note 5, at 620.
The sole source cited on this sentence’s point is one of Tourre’s emails. Id.
28. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 15; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE,
supra note 5, at 561.
29. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 19.
30. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 567. Understandably,
Paulson and Goldman point fingers at each other here: Tourre claims Paulson sought to
employ a portfolio selection agent while a Paulson Managing Director testified in a
deposition that Goldman suggested the idea. Id.
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CDO were selected by a well-regarded, neutral third party.31 Emails
written by Tourre and other Goldman employees suggest that they
believed it was essential that the portfolio selection agent be willing to
allow Paulson to select the underlying assets for Abacus.32 Despite
ACA’s neutral appearance, Paulson played an intimate role in selecting
the assets underlying Abacus.33
From January to March 2007, Paulson worked closely with
Goldman and ACA to select the assets that Abacus would reference.34
After analyzing BBB-rated mortgages and bonds comprised of such
mortgages, Paulson developed a set of criteria that Goldman could
reference in selecting the assets that would comprise Abacus.35 Using
the criteria, Goldman selected securities and returned a database
containing those selections to Paulson for review.36 From that database
of candidates, Paulson selected 123 securities, which Goldman then
passed on to ACA.37 Through alleged representations by Goldman, ACA
believed that Paulson was going long on Abacus.38 Over the next few
months, ACA worked with Paulson to finalize the portfolio.39 The CDO

31. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 22-24; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 565 (quoting an internal Goldman memorandum stating:
“We expect to leverage ACA’s credibility and franchise to help distribute this
transaction.”). The Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, also references the same quote at
paragraph 24.
32. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 562-63.
33. Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 25-35; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 396-97.
34. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 565-66.
35. Id.; Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 25. As for the criteria Paulson
developed: “[it] included a high percentage of adjustable rate mortgages, relatively low
borrower FICO scores, and a high concentration of mortgages in states like Arizona,
California, Florida and Nevada that had recently experienced high rates of home price
appreciation.” Id.
36. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 566.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 396, 569. This misrepresentation and various actions by Goldman
surrounding this issue are discussed infra Part V.B.i. Tourre “categorically” denied
these allegations when testifying to the Subcommittee on Investigations. See Wall
Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Investment Banks Hearing]
(statement of Fabrice Tourre).
39. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 566.
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reference portfolio was finalized on March 22, 2007 with Paulson and
ACA agreeing to include 90 Baa2 rated mid and subprime RMBS issued
after January 1, 2006.40 Of the 90 securities underlying Abacus, Paulson
proposed 49 and ACA proposed 41 with both sides approving every
security included.41 With the reference portfolio finalized, Goldman
sought to have Abacus rated by Moody’s.42
Without being cognizant of Paulson’s involvement in Abacus,
Moody’s issued AAA ratings to two of Abacus’s six tranches.43 Later,
before Senator Levin’s Subcommittee on Investigations, a former
Moody’s director who worked on appraising Abacus testified that
knowing about Paulson’s involvement would have been an important
consideration in rating Abacus.44 A finalized portfolio and solid rating in
hand, Goldman began issuing Abacus securities to investors.45
Abacus closed and issued securities on April 26, 2007, with three
investors taking the long side and one going short on the CDO.46 The
three long investors purchased slightly more than $1 billion in Abacus
securities: 1) IKB, a German commercial bank, bought $150 million
AAA-rated Abacus securities; 2) ACA, the portfolio selection agent,
purchased $42 million AAA-rated Abacus securities to place in another
CDO it was managing; and 3) ACA’s parent, ACA Financial Guaranty
Corp., went long $909 million on assets referenced by the most senior
Abacus tranche.47 At the same time, Goldman took the short side of
these investments, and, unknown to the three aforementioned investors,

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 568.
Id.; Investment Banks Hearing, supra note 38, statement of Sen. Carl Levin.
Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Credit Ratings Agencies:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Eric
Kolchinsky, Former Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Services) (“[Knowing
about Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process and its short position]
just changes the whole dynamic on [Abacus], where the person who is putting it
together, choosing it, wants it to blow up.”).
45. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 572.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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transferred those short interests to Paulson.48 As a result of this transfer,
Paulson’s bet against the CDO went unknown to the long investors.49
The value of the securities underlying Abacus fell dramatically in
the year following Abacus’s closing.50 By October 24, 2007, 83% of
those RMBS were downgraded by the ratings agencies.51 By January 29,
2008, 99% of them were downgraded.52 Abacus’s three long investors
lost more than $1 billion combined while Paulson, as the corresponding
and only short investor, collected a profit of about $1 billion from the
CDO.53 Abacus securities are currently worthless.54
B. THREE CDOS THAT GOLDMAN ITSELF SHORTED
The following three CDOs are grouped together because they are
similar in nature and also because Goldman itself took short positions on
their performance.
1. Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 (“Hudson”)
Hudson was a $2 billion synthetic CDO referencing $1.2 billion in
ABX assets owned by Goldman and $800 million in Credit Default
Swaps (“CDS”) based on subprime RMBS and CDO securities.55
Additionally, all assets referenced by Hudson were rated BBB or
BBB-.56 Anatomy of a Financial Crisis argues that Hudson was used by
Goldman to transfer the risk of that $1.2 billion in declining ABX assets
to its clients, buyers of Hudson securities, while, at the same time,
choosing an additional $800 million in subprime securities to package,

48. Id. It is noteworthy here that the even if Goldman held on to the short position
in Abacus, it still would have run afoul of Section 621 despite the fact investors are
alleged to be under the impression that ACA selected the underlying portfolio.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 573 (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5).
52. Id. (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5).
53. Id. (citing Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 5).
54. Id. at 10.
55. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 390. ABX is an index
that charts the performance of U.S. subprime residential mortgage based credit default
swaps.
56. Id.
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sell, and short.57 Goldman owned the entire short interest in Hudson,
giving it direct profits if any part of Hudson lost value.58
To structure the transaction, Goldman established a special purpose
entity (“SPE”) to issue Hudson securities.59 Using CDS trades, Goldman
synthetically moved the $1.2 billion in aforementioned assets off its
books, along with the $800 million worth of additional securities it
selected, to the SPE.60 Goldman made payments to the SPE in exchange
for the SPE’s promise to pay Goldman the full value of the referenced
securities should they default or experience other specified adverse
credit events.61 Goldman’s payments enabled the SPE to make interest
payments to long side investors.62 On the short side, Goldman would
stop making payments on the referenced securities to the SPE at
specified triggering events such as a mass default on the underlying
mortgages, then the SPE would stop paying the long investors, and then
Goldman would begin receiving payments from the SPE.63 It is most
important to note that Goldman’s interests here are directly opposed to
those of the long investors, its clients.64 Indeed, Goldman sold long
interests in the CDO to its clients as investment opportunities as it went
short on the same CDO.65 In the end, Goldman gleaned a $1.7 billion
profit from Hudson while one of the largest Hudson investors, Morgan
Stanley, lost about $960 million.66
2. Anderson Mezzanine 2007-1 (“Anderson”)
Issued March 2007, Anderson was a synthetic CDO referencing
$305 million worth of BBB and BBB- rated subprime RMBS.67
Goldman did not select the underlying assets, but instead hired GSC

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 524 (citing Investment Banks Hearing, supra
note 38).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 525; ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 392.
67. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 392.
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Partners, a hedge fund managed by former Goldman employees, to
perform that task.68 GSC Partners selected the underlying assets and
Goldman then approved them.69 Goldman owned 40% of the short side
of Anderson.70 Within seven months of Anderson’s issuance, its
underlying securities were downgraded by the ratings agencies, and
almost all of those securities are currently worthless.71
With an intimate knowledge of the underlying securities, Goldman
had positioned itself to take advantage of the poor performance of the
assets underlying Anderson.72 More than 45% of those assets originated
from a company called New Century.73 The Subcommittee’s report
notes that Goldman had purchased a number of New Century loans on
its own, but was in the process of demanding repayment due to the
loans’ exceptionally poor performance.74 Although Goldman lost money
on the overall transaction, this loss was in part offset by the $131 million
it gained via its short positions on the CDO.75
3. Timberwolf I (“Timberwolf”)
Timberwolf was a $1 billion hybrid CDO.76 Timberwolf referenced
56 different A-rated securities from other CDOs, which themselves
referenced more than 4,500 RMBS securities with less attractive credit
ratings, generally BBB.77 Like Hudson, Goldman did not select the
securities that Timberwolf referenced, leaving that task to Greywolf
Capital Management which, like GSC Partners, is a hedge fund run by
former Goldman employees.78 Goldman took a short position on 36% of

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 393.
Id. The fact that Timberwolf referenced CDOs, which themselves referenced
asset-backed securities makes Timberwolf a hybrid.
78. Id. Greywolf selected the assets and submitted them to Goldman for approval.
Id. at 542.
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Timberwolf’s securities.79 From that short interest, Goldman made $330
million at the direct expense of long side investors.80 But, despite the
earnings from the short position, Goldman lost about $455 million on
Timberwolf overall due to its inability to sell all the long side shares in
the structure.81
C. STATEMENTS ABOUT THE GOLDMAN CDOS
BY SECTION 621’S DRAFTERS
Throughout the legislative history of Section 621, Senators Levin
and Merkley repeatedly referenced the Goldman CDOs and linked them
to the need for prevention of material conflicts of interest. This subpart
examines how Senator Levin’s opening statement at the Investment
Banks Hearing set the stage for his argument that Goldman’s actions
involving transactions where it had material conflicts of interest
contributed to the Financial Crisis. From there, this subpart looks at
statements during the development and passage of Section 621. From
this analysis, it is clear that the Goldman CDOs played a major role in
the justification for Section 621 in the eyes of its drafters.
In his opening statement at the Investment Banks Hearing, Senator
Levin explained his understanding of the implications of Goldman’s
actions regarding the Goldman CDOs. He argued:
“Goldman’s actions demonstrate that it often saw its clients not as
valuable customers, but as objects for its own profit. This matters
because instead of doing well when its clients did well, Goldman
Sachs did well when its clients lost money. Its conduct brings into
question the whole function of Wall Street, which traditionally has
been seen as an engine of growth, betting on America’s successes
82
and not its failures.”

79. Id. at 393. Goldman earned $330 million in revenue from this short position,
but this only helped to offset the total losses Goldman incurred with Timberwolf. Id. at
559. In fact, Goldman earned that $330 million along with $3 million in interest while
losing $562 million on Timberwolf securities it failed to sell and another $226 million
in securities used to secure the CDO that lost value. Id. In all, Goldman lost $455
million on Timberwolf. Id.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id.
82. Investment Banks Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
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Senator Levin’s opening statement frames the issue as one where
Goldman betrayed its clients for the sake of its own profits.83 According
to Senator Levin’s remarks, when Goldman realized that subprime
mortgages were destined to lose value en masse, it packaged them
together and sold them to long investors (its clients) while it took the
short side, insisting to those investors that the mortgages were still good
investments despite Goldman’s own short positions on them.84
Senator Levin’s floor statements before the Senate further illustrate
how Goldman’s connection led him to draft Section 621. On May 10,
2010, Senator Levin, in explaining Section 621, called on the Senate to
“end to the self-dealing” after saying that his Subcommittee’s
investigation found that “Goldman Sachs act[ed] as its own secret client,
betting against its customers.”85 In a May 20, 2010 floor speech, Senator
Levin echoed the statements from his May 10 speech and then went on
to characterize the Goldman CDOs and Goldman’s actions surrounding
them as “one of the most dramatic findings” of his Subcommittee’s
investigation into the Financial Crisis.86 On July 15, 2010, Senator Levin
explained to the Senate that Section 621 “addresses the blatant conflicts
of interest in the underwriting of asset-backed securities highlighted in a
hearing with Goldman Sachs before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations . . . .”87 Here, it is clear that the Goldman CDOs
influenced Section 621’s drafters and the Senators who voted to include
it in the final version of Dodd-Frank.
After Section 621 was placed into Dodd-Frank and Dodd-Frank
was signed into law, Senators Levin and Merkley continued to explain
the significance of their work while linking it back to Goldman and the
Goldman CDOs. In their policy essay published in Summer 2011, the
Senators explained: “Hudson Mezzanine and other similar transactions
represent securities underwriting, derivatives dealing, and proprietary
trading at their most conflicted. Goldman Sachs intentionally designed
the product to take a proprietary trading position against the firm’s own

83. Id. (“Goldman Sachs also made out big time in its bet against its own products
and its own clients.”).
84. Id.
85. 156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). Note
Senator Levin’s language faulting Goldman for “secret” actions, implicitly arguing that
part of the issue is, indeed, a lack of disclosure by Goldman of its short positions.
86. 156 CONG. REC. S 4058 (May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
87. 156 CONG. REC. S 5899 (July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
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risky exposure, and it then marketed the CDO it had designed to fail.”88
Similarly, in an August 2011 letter to Mary Shapiro,89 Chairman of the
SEC, regarding the implementation of Section 621, the Senators wrote:
“The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing on Goldman
Sachs highlighted a blatant example of this practice [firms taking short
positions on securities they structure or sell]: the firm assembled assetbacked securities, sold those securities to clients, bet against them, and
then profited from the failures.”90 Thus, the Senators asked that the SEC
draft “regulations implementing [S]ection 621 . . . [that] put an end to
those conflict-ridden practices.”91 Again, in presenting the purpose and
goals of Section 621, whether to the general public and legal community
in the Policy Essay or the regulators charged with drafting the rules
implementing Section 621 in the Letter to Chairman Shapiro, Senators
Merkley and Levin were steadfast in linking Section 621 back to the
Goldman CDOs.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Section 621 is part of the Merkley-Levin Provisions, which are part
of the Dodd-Frank Act.92 As relevant to Section 621, Dodd-Frank’s core
goals are to protect: 1) the U.S. economy from suffering another
debilitating financial crisis; and 2) taxpayers from again being called
upon to rescue failed financial firms.93 Adding Sections 619-621 to
Dodd-Frank, the Merkley-Levin Provisions amend and augment DoddFrank as originally proposed, and in doing so, seek to “strengthen [it] by

88. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 525. Immediately after, the Senators
reemphasized their point: “Goldman Sachs, pursuing its own self-interest, created a
product so that it could obtain the short exposure it wanted and then sold the long
exposure to clients. It not only bet against its clients; it loaded the dice.” Id. The
Senators’ reference to “load[ing] the dice” is similar to the casino example at Part I,
supra, though here the Senators accuse Goldman of cheating and not simply taking an
adverse or conflicted position.
89. Merkley-Levin Letter, supra note 19, is addressed to the heads of all the
agencies responsible for drafting the regulations implementing the Merkley-Levin
Provisions. Because the SEC will write the rules implementing Section 621, only Mary
Shapiro is listed for the purposes of this essay.
90. Merkley-Levin Letter, supra note 19.
91. Id.
92. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 532.
93. See supra note 1; Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 515.
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seeking to limit the damage . . . proprietary transactions can inflict on
[the] economy and end the conflicts of interest which too often
accompany them.”94 Both Senator Levin and Senator Merkley
participated extensively in investigating the causes of the Financial
Crisis and responding to them.95 Their work in the investigation
informed the process of drafting and enacting the Merkley-Levin
Provisions.96
Senator Levin’s involvement began in November 2008, when the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Senator Levin,
began its investigation into the “key causes” of the Financial Crisis with
the goals of creating a record of facts, informing legislative discourse
about the need for financial reforms, and helping to protect ordinary
Americans from the excesses of Wall Street.97 In Spring 2010, Senator
Levin’s Subcommittee held four hearings, each on a different “root”
cause of the Financial Crisis.98 One of those hearings, examining
“Investment Banking Abuses,” dealt closely with Goldman and the
Subcommittee required CEO Lloyd Blankfein and Tourre, among
others, to testify.99 In April 2011, Senator Levin’s Subcommittee issued
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis, a report that extensively details the
findings of the Subcommittee’s investigation into the causes of the
Financial Crisis.100
Senator Merkley traces his involvement to Spring 2009, when he
raised the issue of proprietary trading among banks in hearings

94.
95.
96.
97.

156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
See infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
Id.
See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 1; Investment Banks
Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“Our Subcommittee’s goal is to
construct a record of the facts in order to deepen public understanding of what went
wrong; to inform the ongoing legislative debate about the need for financial reform; and
to provide a foundation for building better defenses to protect Main Street from the
excesses of Wall Street.”).
98. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 2.
99. Id. at 7-10; see also Sachs and the Shitty: A Ghastly Day on Capital Hill for
Goldman’s Top Brass, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16
009137.
100. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5.
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conducted by the Senate Banking Committee.101 By Summer 2009,
Senator Merkley was collaborating with Paul Volcker, Chairman of the
President’s Economic Advisor Board, on issues concerning proprietary
trading.102 As result of the collaboration, a proposal was made for the
Government Accountability Office to study the issue of proprietary
trading.103 Eventually, this study became a springboard for the Volcker
Rule, which is Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act.104
Senator Dodd’s original financial reform bill did not contain any
restrictions on proprietary trading, although it did contain the study on
the topic requested by Senator Merkley.105 On February 2, 2010,
Chairman Volcker argued for restrictions on proprietary trades and the
conflicts of interest that often accompany such trades in testimony
before the Senate Banking Committee.106 On March 4, 2010 the
Treasury Department released its proposal regarding the method for
enacting Volcker’s suggestions, and the proposal did not mention
conflicts of interest.107 On March 10, 2010, Senators Levin and Merkley,
along with three colleagues, introduced Protect our Recovery through
Oversight of Proprietary Trading Act (“PROP” Trading Act), their
version of the Volcker Rules.108 Among other changes to the Treasury
proposal, the PROP Trading Act included the prohibition on material
conflicts of interest contained in the final Section 621.109 Despite the

101. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 531 (citing Establishing a Framework for
Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 37 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley)).
102. Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 531-32.
103. See id.
104. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 535-37.
105. Id. at 532 (citing Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009, 111th
Cong. § 989 (2009) (Discussion Draft)).
106. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank
Holding Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 5-8, 49-53 (2010) (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman,
President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board). These restrictions were dubbed the
Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule is embodied by Dodd-Frank Section 619, the first of
the Merkley-Levin Provisions. See 156 CONG. REC. S5894 (July 15, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Jeffrey Merkley).
107. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 533-34.
108. PROP Trading Act, S. 3098, 111th Cong. § 6 (2010).
109. Id. § 27B(a)(1) (amending the Securities Act of 1933). Interestingly, the PROP
Trading Act is stricter than Section 621, as it contains a catchall clause prohibiting any
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PROP Trading Act, Senator Dodd revised his financial reform bill to
include a modified version of the Treasury Proposal, which prompted
Senators Merkley and Levin, flanked by over twenty co-sponsors, to
introduce on May 10, 2010 a modified version of PROP as an
amendment to Sen. Dodd’s bill.110 Following successful reconciliation,
the Merkley-Levin Provisions were incorporated into the final version of
Dodd-Frank.111
In explaining the rationale behind Section 621, Senator Levin was
clear that the Subcommitte’s investigation had a profound effect on the
development of the rule. Senator Levin stated Section 621 “address[es]
one of the most dramatic findings of [the Subcommittee on
Investigations],” which was that “firms [were] betting against financial
instruments they are assembling and selling.”112 He specifically
mentioned Goldman, arguing that Goldman was “betting against its
customers.”113
IV. SECTION 621 RUNS COUNTER TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION, WHICH ALREADY REGULATE
MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Authorities are clear that the bedrock of federal securities
regulation is disclosure. In enacting the major securities statutes,
Congress rejected the so-called merit-based approach to securities
regulation, the approach espoused in many state securities laws, which
allows the government to approve of each and every offering on its
merits (i.e. assess the actual qualities possessed by the securities
offered). Instead, Congress opted for a disclosure-based approach. The
logic behind the disclosure approach employed by Congress is that
proper disclosure allows investors to make informed decisions about
their purchases while market forces decide what is and what is not an
acceptable investment.
At the same time, information barriers are worthwhile tools already
used in federal securities regulation in the context of conflicts of

conflict of interest that would “undermine the value, risk, or performance of the assetbacked security.” Id. § 27B(a)(2).
110. See Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 535-37.
111. Id. at 537-38.
112. 156 CONG. REC. S3470 (May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
113. Id.
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interest. By keeping information within companies separate in response
to or in anticipation of conflicts of interest, regulators are able to prevent
misuse of information.
This section uses the aforementioned aspects of the securities laws
to show why Section 621 is not only a misfit among existing principles
of securities regulation but also why it should be modified, in light of
these principles.
A. THE BEDROCK OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION IS DISCLOSURE
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress created the two
fundamental federal statutes governing securities offerings and market
trading, the Securities Act of 1993 (the “Securities Act”)114 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).115 Among other
reasons, these statutes were enacted to prevent another depression or
similar financial disaster.116 The two statutes create a series of
mandatory disclosure requirements for businesses that wish to issue or
trade securities in certain contexts.117 This is because the statutes’
drafters focused on disclosure, determining it was the preferred method
to ensure the markets were well-regulated and functional.118 The
disclosure premise of the securities laws seeks to create information
parity between buyers and sellers, which allows the securities in the
market to reach their fair market value as efficiently as possible.119 The

114.
115.
116.

15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2006).
Id. § 78a et seq.
See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1223-36 (1999).
117. Id. Williams identifies four categories of disclosure under these laws: 1) the
Securities Act requires initial disclosure in association with the first offering for sale of
a security to public; 2) the Exchange Act requires quarterly (also called “periodic”)
reporting on securities; 3) proxy disclosures are required in connection with elections
conducted at shareholders’ meetings; 4) disclosure is required in connection with
certain events such as mergers, tender offers, or sales of the business. Id. at 1207.
118. See AM. JUR. 2D Securities § 60.
119. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 254 (1973) (“Congressional committees
have stressed the importance of providing full information for both the buyer and the
seller . . . . The concept of a free and open market for securities necessarily implies that
the buyer and seller are acting in the exercise of enlightened judgment as to what
constitutes a fair price . . . . The objective of a fair market cannot be achieved when one
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SEC’s website today bears this credo when describing the SEC’s
purpose and the philosophy of federal securities regulation.120
Perhaps the most famous edification of disclosure comes from
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who wrote: “Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”121 In
developing the securities laws, Congress rejected arguments for meritbased regulation, popular among states securities regulatory regimes at
the time, which would have allowed government approve of each and
every offering on its merits, and other more stringent regulation of
securities in favor of the eventual disclosure-based approach.122 In doing
so, Congress decided that investors and markets were protected
sufficiently by full and fair disclosure.123 In other words, Congress

of the parties to the transaction has inside information unavailable to the other.”)
(quotations omitted).
120. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/wh
atwedo.shtml (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large
institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an
investment . . . .”) (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
121. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914), available at http://ia600309.us.archive.org/32/items/otherpeoplesmone00bra
n/otherpeoplesmone00bran.pdf. Though he was not directly involved in drafting either
statute because he was sitting on the Supreme Court by the 1930s, Justice Brandies had
great influence on then-Professor Felix Frankfurter and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who were both instrumental in the development of the statutes. See
Williams, supra note 116, at 1212-13.
122. See LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 32-45 (Aspen 5th ed. 2004) (explaining that Justice
Brandeis’s disclosure approach was picked instead of then-Professor William O.
Douglas’s arguments for greater control over the securities markers); THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW I.A (2003) (“After considerable debate, Congress
decided not to adopt the merit regulatory approach of the state acts, opting instead for a
system of full disclosure.”).
Despite this history of a disclosure-based approach, there is support for
installing the merit approach at the federal level. See, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit
Review, 44 U. RICH L. REV. 647 (2010).
123. HAZEN, supra note 122, at I.A; AM. JUR. 2D Securities § 60 (“The basic
objective of the Securities Act is to protect the public, securities investors, and domestic
securities markets, from the manipulation of stock prices, by requiring, particularly in
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employed a philosophy of regulating what could or needed to be said
about securities to their purchasers and the public, rather than
implementing a regime that regulated the quality of securities offered for
sale.124 In fact, the disclosure regime allows investors to sell risky or
even unsafe securities as long as proper disclosure is made.125 This
underlying philosophy of disclosure is recognized by the Supreme Court
throughout its canon.126
B. EXISTING LAW ON FRAUD AND MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS AND
OMISSIONS SUFFICIENTLY GOVERNS MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
There are several provisions under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act and associated rules that provide investors and the SEC
with a cause of action for alleged violations of the securities laws.127
Although a detailed analysis of the various provisions and rules is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note the basic
principles here to frame the allegations made by the SEC and investors
discussed below. These laws are premised on protecting investors from
fraud and focus on the materiality of the disclosures they require. For
liability to be imposed for a misstatement or omission regarding a
security, that misstatement or omission must relate to a “material
fact.”128 The SEC’s rules governing Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act states that a fact is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to
purchase the security” at issue.129 Similarly, although the SEC has not
expressly defined “material fact” under Section 10(b) of the Exchange

regard to the initial distribution of securities, full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions.”).
124. HAZEN, supra note 122, at I.A.
125. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1801 (2011).
126. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (“The design of
the [Securities Act] is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information
thought necessary to informed investment decisions.”); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
646 (1988) (“[T]he purpose . . . of the [Securities] Act . . . [is] to promote full and fair
disclosure of information to the public in the sales of securities.”).
127. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i, 77q, 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2009).
128. 14 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA Corporations § 6862 (2011).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405.
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Act (and Rule 10b-5130 by extension) courts have stated a fact is material
“if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been
considered significant by a reasonable investor” in deciding whether or
not to purchase or sell the security in question.131 Failure to disclose a
conflict of interest has produced liability because conflicts of interest
have been found by courts to be material.132
Rule 10b-5 is the primary remedy for securities suits stemming
from allegations of fraud.133 This Rule is especially expansive because it
covers any purchase or sale of any security by any person, unlike other
causes of action under the securities laws which generally deal with
registered offerings or mandatory disclosure statements.134 Rule 10b-5
implicates fraud and therefore requiresa showing of scienter, or “intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”135 There is disharmony among the
circuit courts, but some circuits recognize “severe” or “fact-specific”
recklessness as sufficient to show scienter.136 One of the main purposes
of Rule 10b-5 is to achieve information parity in the market by
eliminating insider trading.137
Subparts i-iii explain how the allegations made by the government
against Goldman fall under these traditional causes of action made
pursuant to the securities laws.138 These Subparts further highlight

130.
131.
132.

Id. § 240.10b5-1.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988).
See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir.1970)
(“[F]ailure to inform the customer fully of its possible conflict of interest . . . was an
omission of material fact . . . .”).
133. HAZEN, supra note 122, at IV.E.
134. Id.
135. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).
136. See, e.g., Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282-83 (11th Cir.
1999) (discussing circuit split).
137. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236
(2d Cir. 1974) (Rule 10b-5 is “based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information.”) (citation omitted).
138. There is an argument to be made here that such allegations and lawsuits had to
be made pursuant to established securities laws because there was no prohibition on
material conflicts of interest until Section 621 became law. While I agree that these
allegations would, of course, have to be tailored to the law in effect at the time the
allegations were made, my point is not simply that the existing securities laws can be
used to fashion such allegations. My point here, rather, is that the securities laws
provide a sufficient, and even preferable, basis for doing so.
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private litigation and SEC regulatory action against Goldman and
another defendant for alleged securities laws violations.
1. The Government’s Allegations Against Goldman Implicate
Traditional Securities Laws
The government’s allegations surrounding the Abacus transaction
directly implicate existing securities laws. On April 16, 2010, the SEC
filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against Goldman
and Tourre under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.139 The allegations stem from misstatements and
fraud.140 Specifically, the government alleged: 1) failure to disclose
Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process to Abacus
buyers; 2) failure to disclose Paulson’s short interest to ACA; 3)
misrepresenting that Paulson had a long interest to ACA; 4) failure to
disclose Paulson’s involvement in the portfolio selection process to the
ratings agencies; and 5) failure to disclose Paulson’s short interest to
long investors in light of its role in structuring the portfolio.141
Anatomy of a Financial Crisis makes several allegations of
securities laws violations against Goldman relating to disclosure and
fraud in its communications with buyers of Hudson securities. First, it is
alleged that Goldman’s marketing materials stated that Goldman’s
interests were aligned with long investors because Goldman was slated
to purchase part of Hudson’s equity tranche.142 Second, it is alleged that
Goldman failed to mention that it was shorting the entire portfolio
referenced by Hudson.143 Third, it is alleged that Goldman led investors
to believe that the portfolio referenced by Hudson was picked by neutral
parties when the portfolio was actually picked by Goldman and,
furthermore, $1.2 billion of the portfolio came straight off of Goldman’s

139.
140.
141.
142.

Abacus Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 67-74.
Id.
Id.
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391 (quotation omitted);
Policy Essay, supra note 7, at 525.
143. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391. Despite this
representation, Goldman did disclose that it “may” invest short in Hudson. Id. Thus,
Goldman disclosed that it had the potential to be short when, in fact, it was short. For a
discussion about why Goldman’s actions here are insufficient disclosure under
emerging federal case law, see infra Part V.C.
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books.144 Fourth, it is alleged that Goldman did not disclose that all
assets referenced by Hudson were priced by Goldman and not by
referencing third party sales of those assets.145 Fifth, it is alleged that the
Subcommittee’s report evidences that Goldman dragged its feet in
responding to client requests that it begin selling Hudson assets that
were declining in value because Goldman’s short position was gaining
more value as the assets declined.146
Again, like Abacus and Hudson, Anatomy of a Financial Collapse
makes a number allegations under existing securities laws against
Goldman for its actions relating to Anderson. First, it is alleged that
despite Goldman’s understanding that New Century, the originator of
many of the underlying mortgages referenced by Anderson, was in
financial trouble and that Goldman was in the process of demanding
repayments of many loans on its books from New Century, Goldman did
not disclose its own negative views of New Century to potential long
investors in Anderson.147 Second, it is alleged that Goldman actually
claimed to be “comfortable” with New Century’s products and even
issued talking points to sales staff aimed at assuaging potential clients’
fears about the company.148 Third, it is alleged that Goldman did not
disclose its short position in Anderson.149 Fourth, it is alleged that not
only did Goldman fail to disclose its short position, but it actually led
investors to believe it had a 50% stake in Anderson’s equity tranche,
meaning it was long on Anderson.150 Fifth, it is alleged that Goldman
did not tell investors that it nearly cancelled Anderson due to falling
values of the structure’s underlying securities.151
The Subcommittee’s report is critical of Goldman’s actions
involving Timberwolf on many fronts, but it does not outline many
strong securities laws violations.152 The strongest allegation in the report

144. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391; Policy Essay,
supra note 7, at 525.
145. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 391.
146. Id. at 391-92.
147. Id. at 393.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 541.
151. Id.
152. Although Timberwolf seems to have the least clear violations of securities laws
when compared to the other examined Goldman CDOs and Timberwolf resulted in a
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regarding Timberwolf is that Goldman withheld its short position from
investors.153 It is also alleged that Goldman failed to disclose its internal
analyses showing that Timberwolf was losing value.154 Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse also provides examples to support its allegations that
Goldman “targeted” its sales towards clients inexperienced with
purchasing CDOs, while at the same time offering those customers as
little information on Timberwolf as possible.155
2. Some Goldman CDOs Result in Prosecution and Settlement Under
Existing Securities Laws
In July 2010, Goldman settled with the SEC ending its portion of
the Abacus case.156 In the settlement Goldman agreed to pay $535
million in civil penalties and disgorge $15 million.157 Although
Goldman did not admit or deny the complaint’s allegations, the
settlement stated that Goldman’s failure to disclose Paulson’s role in the
portfolio selection process was a “mistake” because Paulson’s interests
were adverse to the CDO’s other investors.158 Although Goldman’s lack
of admissions fails to provide collateral opportunities for private

net loss for Goldman, Timberwolf does present the report’s authors with several
excellent storylines in furtherance of condemning Goldman. First, the report details two
victims of Timberwolf: a Korean life insurance company that had no experience in the
CDO market and an Australian hedge fund that went bankrupt in part from its exposure
to Timberwolf. Id. at 549-55. Second, an eminently quotable email, featuring a
Goldman trader calling Timberwolf “one shitty deal,” came to represent the sentiment
of many at Goldman about the long side of the transaction. Id. at 395, 554, 561. Senator
Levin continually quoted the email in berating its author’s supervisor. See Brian
Montopoli, Levin Repeatedly References “Sh**ty Deal” at Goldman Hearing, CBS
NEWS, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20003526503544.html.
153. Id. at 559.
154. ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 559.
155. Id.
156. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010); see also Press Release, SEC, Goldman
Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm
[hereinafter SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release].
157. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2010).
158. Id.
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litigants (i.e. the long-side investors harmed by Abacus’s failure),159
Goldman’s civil penalty is remarkable because of its size as compared to
the actual profits it gleaned from the transaction. The civil penalty was
the largest settlement ever assessed by the SEC against a financial
services firm and its size dwarfs the $15 million in actual profits that
Goldman gained from Abacus.160 It is unclear what the outcome will be
for Tourre because as of the settlement date his case was still pending.161
Likewise, private actions against Goldman regarding Abacus have also
been initiated.162
Goldman also faces liability in a variety of private lawsuits,
including class actions and derivative suits, stemming from the other
CDOs examined in this comment.163 In fact, these lawsuits, when
combined, seek to collect $15.8 billion in rescission alone from
Goldman.164 In a regulatory filing, Goldman classifies such suits as
“generally alleging that the offering documents for the securities . . .

159. Settlements that contain admissions can, in certain situations, be used against
the admitting party in subsequent actions by plaintiffs harmed by the same
circumstances giving rise to the settled case. See generally 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE § 4443 (West 2d Ed. 2011)
(explaining the applicability of consent judgments to later litigations).
160. See SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release, supra note 156. One federal judge
even remarked upon the size of this penalty in deciding that settlement in a similar case
brought by the SEC, discussed infra at Part V.B.iii, was insufficient. See Order and
Opinion 13 n.7, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 2011) (Rakoff, J.) [hereinafter Citigroup Order]. In other words, the size of
this settlement may act as a lodestar for actions to come.
161. See SEC Goldman Settlement Press Release, supra note 156. See also Docket,
SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010).
162. See, e.g., ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/2011
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 6, 2011). In this case, Goldman responds, inter alia, to ACA’s
complaint of fraud and material misstatements by asserting that Paulson’s investment
strategy is not a material fact and therefore, did not need to be. Goldman further
responded that ACA never asked Goldman or Paulson for information regarding
Paulson’s position. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., No. 650027/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2011). This motion has not yet been
decided.
163. See, e.g., ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/2011
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 6, 2011).
164. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 96 (Nov.
8, 2011).
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contained untrue statements of material facts and material omissions”
and furthermore “[c]ertain of these complaints allege fraud and seek
punitive damages.”165 From this, it seems clear that traditional securities
laws have provided an ample basis for both the government and private
litigants to sue Goldman for perceived misdeeds surrounding the
conflicted CDOs that gave rise to Section 621.
3. Cases Similar to the Goldman CDOs Result in Prosecution Under
Existing Securities Laws
On October 19, 2011, the SEC filed a Complaint against Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”) for securities laws violations
involving circumstances similar to the Goldman CDOs described in this
Comment.166 The Complaint alleged that Citigroup had selected a series
of mortgage-backed securities from its own books that it believed would
perform poorly.167 From there, it is alleged that Citigroup packaged
those assets and others into a CDO and proceeded to sell long interests
in that CDO, labeling them strong investments and representing to
investors that it had hired an independent advisor to select the CDO’s
underlying assets.168 On the same day that it filed the complaint, the
SEC asked the District Court to approve a consent judgment to settle the
case where Citigroup would disgorge $160 million in profits gleaned
from the CDO, pay $30 million in interest owed on those profits, and
pay a civil penalty of $95 million.169 The consent judgment did not
require Citigroup to admit or deny any of the allegations in the
complaint.170 The presiding judge, the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, refused
to sign the consent judgment for a number of reasons stemming from the
SEC’s not requiring Citigroup to admit any of the allegations in the

165.
166.

Id.
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct.
19, 2011). The SEC specifically charged violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the
Securities Act. Complaint ¶ 65, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ.
7387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011).
167. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 2, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011).
168. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 58.
169. Citigroup Order, supra note 160, at 3.
170. Id.
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complaint.171 Despite the fact that there is not yet a conclusion in this
case, the point to be made is that the SEC can use the existing securities
laws to bring enforcement actions against defendants for perceived
misdeeds associated with similar conflicts of interest as those described
in this Comment. Again, the actual misdeed comes from lack of
disclosure and misstatements about the conflict of interest rather than
anything inherently wrong with the conflict of interest.
C. A FEDERAL COURT’S DECISION CONCERNING DISCLOSURE OF
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CAN BE APPLIED TO THE GOLDMAN CDOS
In 2006, the SEC convinced a Central District of California court
that a defendant made material misstatements in violation of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5, and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act for stating that his company’s employees “may” have an
interest in the securities that the defendant’s company recommended via
its website when the defendant “knew” his employees actually “had a
biased interest” in those securities.172 The decision allows for liability
under the securities laws for making an assertion that one may
potentially have a conflict of interest with the buyer that person actually
knows that such a conflict of interest already exists or intends for it to
exist in the future.173 The Czuczko decision relies on SEC v. Blavin, a
Sixth Circuit decision where liability was found when the issuer of an
investment newsletter stated its employees “may” trade in stocks the
newsletter recommended, thusgiving the impression that the newsletter’s
management was unsure of this practice, when in fact the newsletter was
owned as a sole proprietorship and the owner indeed held interests in the
recommended stocks.174
Applying the case to the Goldman CDOs, Anatomy of a Financial
Crisis cites Czuczko quite broadly: “A federal court has held that
disclosing a potential adverse interest, when a known adverse interest
already exists, can constitute a material misstatement to investors.”175
This differs from the analysis at Part IV.B supra because the Czuczko
Court goes a step further in holding that disclosure of a potential conflict

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 15.
SEC v. Czuczko, No. CV 06-4792, slip op. at 8, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007).
Id.
760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985).
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5, at 617.
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of interest is not proper when an actual conflict of interest exists.176 The
analysis at Part IV.B supra only dealt with general lack of disclosure of
a conflict of interest.177 It is important to note that many boilerplate
disclosures include language of unspecific potential conflicts of interest.
An example of such a disclosure is found in the promotional materials
for Hudson, which only disclosed Goldman’s potential to have a conflict
of interest with the long investors when Goldman, in fact, already had an
actual conflict of interest.178
There are limits to Czuczko’s utility in finding liability in the cases
of the Goldman CDOs or transactions that involve similar facts. It is
unclear whether further application will be made to the Goldman CDOs
because litigation involving these products is only at the early stages.
More importantly, the Czuczko decision has not been relied upon by any
federal courts to date.179 Thus, if this decision is to have any further
application to the Goldman CDOs or similar cases, it is currently at the
nascent stage.
D. EXISTING LAW CONCERNING INFORMATION BARRIERS CAN BE
APPLIED TO THE MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT SECTION 621
SEEKS TO PREVENT
Existing securities laws and case law seek to prevent conflicts of
interest in some circumstances by requiring institutions to adopt
information barriers.180 These barriers are systematic, self-enforced
policies and structures, commonly called “Chinese walls” or “ethical
walls,” designed to stop the flow of information between the
institutions’ various units in order to prevent conflicts of interest.181 One

176.
177.
178.

SEC v. Czuczko, No. CV 06-4792, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2007).
See supra Part IV.B.
See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 5. at 617-18, 624; (citing
Goldman Sachs, Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1 LTD. Offering Circular at 56 (Dec. 3,
2006)).
179. The decision remains unpublished in the Federal Reporter and Federal
Appendix and unavailable on the two major electronic databases, Lexis and Westlaw.
Furthermore, searches for citations to Czuczko in either law review articles or case
citations on both Lexis and Westlaw yielded no results.
180. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 76o(g) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2) (2009).
181. The wall is “a self-enforced informational barrier consisting of systematic, as
opposed to ad hoc, procedural and structural arrangements . . . designed to stem the
flow of knowledge . . . between different divisions within a multi-capacity financial
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use of such barriers is to prevent firms from utilizing material nonpublic information they glean from one business unit as a way to trade
on insider information via another business unit.182 In fact, Section 15(f)
of the Exchange Act requires Broker-Dealers to institute policies and
procedures to prevent the spread of material non-public information
among the various units of their firms.183 At the same time, Rule 10b5184 promulgates a defense to insider trading allegations when a
defendant can show that an effective information barrier exists and the
person making the trade was not aware that others at the firm were in
possession of the material non-public information.185 These existing
tools would do much to protect buyers from the same transactions that
Section 621 seeks to prevent.
If effective information barriers were in place, “designed to fail”
transactions would have limited purpose in aiding the firms that
structure them. When a firm’s trading unit is unaware that the same
firm’s financial products structuring unit has designed a specific
transaction to fail, the trading unit cannot go short on the transaction
with any certainty of a return. Although this is a simplification, it holds
up against the Goldman CDOs if they are to serve as an example. In
Abacus, Tourre contacted all the major players in the deal, helped
structure the transaction, and then sold the product to investors.186

intermediary with conflicting interests and obligations.” Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider
Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of Modern
Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets, Symposium, 4 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 311, 313 n.2 (2008) (quoting HARRY MCVEA, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES AND
THE CHINESE WALL: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 123 (1993)); see also Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 887-88 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (Low, P.J., concurring) (lamenting the ethnic overtones and metaphorical
inaccuracies of the term “Chinese wall” and calling for courts to abandon its use).
182. See Norman S. Poser, Chinese Walls or Emperor’s New Clothes? Regulating
Conflicts of Interest of Securities Firms in the U.S. and the U.K., 9 MICH. Y.B. INT’L
LEGAL STUD. 91, 103 (1988) (“[T]he Chinese Wall was created as a preventive measure
to control the specific problem of misuse of inside information by multi-service
securities firms.”).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 76o(g). See Barry W. Rashkover & Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman,
SEC Enforcement and Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, 52 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV.
599, 607 (2007).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1.
185. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2). See Rashkover & Kleiman, supra note 183, at 608.
186. See supra Part III.A.

1294

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

Likewise, the Goldman units that structured Hudson, Anderson, and
Timberwolf all did so with some intent that Goldman was to short those
products.187 Furthermore, Goldman structuring units, according to
Congress, aggressively pushed Goldman’s selling units to peddle the
products while knowing Goldman had a short position.188 Without
knowing such products were structured to fail, Goldman could not be as
certain of getting return.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Thus far, this Comment has described the events prompting the
creation of Section 621 and explained why those events implicate and
are sufficiently regulated by traditional securities laws. In Part VI.A, this
Comment argues that outright ban on securities affected by material
conflicts of interest is not an appropriate solution. This Part also
introduces the notion of a disclosure requirement for material conflicts
of interest in the sale and distribution of securities affected by them.
This requirement would aid in creating information parity in such
transactions while alerting buyers to conflicts of interest. IPart IV.B, I
highlights ways that such a requirement could be promulgated in light of
the current Section 621 and the rule proposed by the SEC implementing
Section 621. From there, this Partproposes the best method, adding a
disclosure exemption to the SEC’s rule implementing Section 621, for
achieving this result and dismissing the other solutions examined.
Finally, Part VI.B.iv.a, provides a recommended draft of this SEC Rule
with an explanation.
A. DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND
UNDERLYING INFORMATION IS PREFERABLE TO AN OUTRIGHT BAN ON
SECURITIES AFFECTED BY SUCH CONFLICTS
The market for securities is based on legitimate differences
between participants. Material conflicts of interest do not change this
fact. Furthermore, as described above, Section 621’s categorical ban
clashes with the securities laws because it eliminates the transactions it
governs rather than facilitating them via disclosure requirements.

187.
188.

See supra Part III.B.
See id.
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Disclosure requirements here would better allow buyers to understand
their purchases and help the market make its own decision about the
value and appropriateness of transactions affected by material conflicts
of interest.
1. Markets Are Driven By Competing Views and Material Conflicts of
Interest Do Not Change This Principle
The capital markets exist largely so that a variety of positions can
be taken by market participants based on their various tolerances for
uncertainty.189 In other words, the markets allow participants with
differing views of the value and the potential value of securities to
increase or decrease their exposure to such price fluctuations without
regard for whether a participant has a negative or positive view of such
value.190 Participants that have legitimate disagreements over the values
of securities, for any number of reasons, can come together and enter
into contracts that allow them manage their exposure to such
securities.191 Indeed, parties can and will have differing views about the
quality and prospects of many investments.192 Even in light of a material
conflict of interest between the structurer and seller of such investments,
incentives to make trades will still exist.193 Accordingly, an outright ban
on such transactions is not preferable when disclosure and curing of
information asymmetries can be regulated.
2. Adequate Disclosure
Parties can have competing views about the prospects and value of
an investment, but more is needed to facilitate their investment

189. See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of
Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 532-33 (2009) (“The capital and insurance
markets . . . exist precisely because people have different views not only of the
expected value of future income but also of the risk associated with that income.”)
(citing FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 268-71 (Dover 2006)
(1921)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and
Economics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1550 (2009).
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relationship.194 Building on the principles of the securities laws,
adequate disclosure is the best method to facilitate investment.195 If
sellers and structurers provided the underlying information196 they used
in their development of the securities being sold, then the goal of
information parity would be furthered.197 If counterparties have access to
the same information as the party that designed a security to fail, all that
remains is a true difference of opinion or other motivations to make the
trade. Because the parties are privy to the same information when proper
disclosure is made, the securities law would deem that both parties have
adequate information for assessing the value of the underlying security
regardless of any material conflict of interest.198
There are two primary ways to promulgate a disclosure requirement
in the context of material conflicts of interest. One way to structure this
requirement would be to create a fiduciary relationship triggered by a
material conflict of interest created by the structurer or seller of a
security.199 In essence, the structurer or seller who bets against its own
securities would have a fiduciary duty to the buyer mandating disclosure
of the information it has about those securities along with its status of
any potential material conflict of interest.200 Another solution would be
keep Section 621’s ban on material conflicts of interest but add a

194. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/wh
atwedo.shtml (explaining that the Securities Laws facilitate investment) (last visited
Mar. 12, 2012).
195. See supra Part V.A.
196. The term “underlying information,” as used here m refers to the raw
information the seller or structurer has exclusive or semi-exclusive access to. This does
not include publically available information or information that derives from a party’s
analysis of any raw data.
197. See Rhee, supra note 189, at 548-49.
198. See supra Part V.A; cf. Ryan Skylar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting
Investments from Hedge Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
3251, 3316 (2009) (“The disclosure of [conflicts of interests involving hedge fund
managers and their funds] could facilitate investment decisions that direct funds into
more suitable investment vehicles . . . .”).
199. Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on insider trading is premised on eliminating
information asymmetry by creating a fiduciary relationship between various classes of
people having inside information and the security issuer’s shareholders. See, e.g., Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
200. Id.
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disclosure exemption to the rule. In that instance, transactions involving
securities affected by material conflicts of interest would still be banned
unless adequate disclosures were made to the buyer. Part VI.B,
highlights the most effective way to promulgate such a disclosure
exemption.
3. Investors Can and Should Price Risk Associated with Material
Conflicts of Interest into Their Agreements if Adequate Disclosure Is
Made
Once the conflict of interest and relevant underlying information
are disclosed, buyers can price the risk associated with them.201 Buyers
here have several options depending on their ability to understand and
value the assets underlying the securities affected by the material
conflict of interest. This Section examines three instances where buyers
can attempt to place values on securities affected by material conflicts of
interest. In all instances, disclosure allows buyers to arrive at appropriate
resolutions.
In the first instance, buyers who are confident in their
understanding of the conflicted securities can use the supplied
information about underlying assets and price accordingly.202 Buyers do
this knowing the conflicted seller or structurer was required to disclose
all the relevant information about the structure’s underlying assets.203 As
such, information parity is more closely achieved and the conflicted
structurer or seller and buyer merely have differing opinions about the
prospects of the securities being sold.204
In the second instance, buyers who are not confident in their ability
to judge the prospects of the securities affected by the conflict of interest
based on the disclosed information may still want to purchase the

201. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (2007) (“Pricing risk is one of the essential functions
of the securities markets, and disclosure of information improves market participants’
ability to assess and price risk.”); see also Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price, and
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003) (empirical
study suggesting that public disclosure laws increase share price accuracy).
202. See Fox et al., supra note 201, at 380-81.
203. See infra Part VI.B (discussing implementation of a disclosure requirement).
204. See Rhee, supra note 189, at 548-49.
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affected securities.205 Here, they can price the very notion of the conflict
of interest into their investment decision.206 If most buyers find
themselves in this situation, the market could face an adverse selection
or “lemon” problem, where legitimate products on the market are
devalued because buyers cannot parse them from similar but somehow
defective or less desirable counterparts due to information asymmetry
between buyers and sellers.207 There, even legitimate, higher quality
securities will be undervalued due to the conflicts of interest they entail.
To differentiate themselves from sellers and structurers who have
designed their transactions to fail, legitimate structurers and sellers
could take additional steps toward providing information parity and
assurances.208 While there are anticipated counterarguments that such
additional disclosure places a burden on legitimate firms, it is important
to remember that for the lemon problem to become pervasive, an
inability to evaluate the offered products must be widespread among
buyers.209 Therefore, once the lemon problem starts to affect legitimate
sellers and structurers and possibly burden them, it is because there is
such a lack of understanding of their offerings in the market that the
market is demanding they take further action.210 More simply put,
legitimate sellers or structurers of securities affected by conflicts of
interest would not become burdened as a result of the lemon problem
until the market actually demanded that they act to differentiate
themselves.211
In the third instance, buyers unable to make sense of the disclosed
information, but alarmed by the existence of a material conflict of
interest would simply abstain from purchasing the securities. Knowing

205.
206.
207.

See Johnsen, supra note 193, at 1550.
See Dalley, supra note 201, at 1094.
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).
208. Cf. Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and System Risk, 45 GA.
L. REV. 779, 804-05 (2011) (suggesting that issuers seek to prevent lemon problems
and cure information asymmetry by submitting to the SEC’s disclosure regimes). But
see James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-YearOld SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 955-56 (2009) (suggesting that issuers who stand to have
higher share prices by combating the lemon problem by proving their superiority may
not respond in a such a manner all the time).
209. See Akerlof, supra note 207.
210. See supra note 208.
211. Id.
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the parameters of the potential investment and their ability to value it,
the buyer decides the risk of being fleeced is too strong.212 While certain
buyers will miss the opportunity to participate in legitimate transactions,
others will not experience losses from their investments and later sue to
recoup their losses based on claims of non-disclosure, misstatements,
and fraud.
B. RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION
This final Part discusses several alternatives and their limitations,
and presents this Comment’s ultimate recommendation.
1. Dismissing Information Barriers
If implemented effectively, information barriers would address the
most salient concerns about material conflicts of interest.213 That is,
information barriers would create a more “equal” scenario because both
seller and buyer would be unaware of the seller’s short position.214 But
the drawbacks of information barriers make them an unfavorable
solution here. The arguments in this Comment highlighting the notion
that there is nothing inherently nefarious with material conflicts of
interest if proper disclosure accompanies them render it difficult to
justify information barriers, which are an extreme implementation.215
Furthermore, information barriers prevent many of the legitimate
purposes that transactions affected by material conflicts can serve,
discussed in this Comment.216 Finally, it would be remiss to fail to
mention that there is some debate as to the effectiveness of information
barriers when put in place.217 Thus, a disclosure requirement is a more
effective and streamlined way to deal with this problem

212. See Homer Kripke, Fifty Years of Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose,
21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 261 (1984) (explaining that mandatory disclosure serves the
purpose of helping investors decide whether to buy, sell, or hold securities).
213. See supra Part V.D.
214. See Id.
215. See supra Part VI.A.
216. See supra Part V.A.
217. See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Symposium, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness
of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 386 (2008) (presenting
“evidence that suggests Chinese walls are porous . . . .” ).
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2. Relying on Federal Case Law is Inadequate Without Increased
Disclosure Requirements
Although current law considers a conflict of interest to be
“material” and requires disclosure in instances where it exists, there are
many instances where firms use boilerplate language to warn about the
possibility of such a conflict existing later.218 Similarly, this law is
incomplete because it deals mostly with disclosing conflicts as they
occur.219 And while the Czuczko opinion, discussed at Part V.C supra,
makes clear that disclosure of a potential conflict when an actual
conflict is already present constitutes an actionable misstatement of
material fact, it still fails to address the situation where a conflict
legitimately develops after the sale of the security.220 Furthermore, the
decision remains unpublished and has not been cited by any federal
courts to date.221 Thus, relying on this case law and waiting for, or
depending on, it to develop is counterintuitive and unlikely to provide
any near term solutions. At the same time, it is unlikely to fully address
the problem at hand.
3. Establishment of a Fiduciary Duty Is Cumbersome
Establishing a fiduciary duty for any party with a material conflict
of interest could also be a method of requiring disclosure of conflicts of
interest and reducing information asymmetry. Such an obligation would
be modeled on the fiduciary duty that already exists in the insider
trading context between holders of material non-public information and
the shareholders owning the effected securities.222 Accomplishing this
would require a statutory or regulatory addition that expressly called for
a fiduciary duty to attach once a structurer or seller of a security decides
to engage in activity that creates a material conflict of interest between it
and the long investors. This, however, would be a cumbersome and illsuited approach, especially in light of the more streamlined
recommendation made infra.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra Part V.
Id.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra note 179.
See supra note 199.
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Fiduciary duties that come from the insider trading context are
judicial constructs to cope with the fraud element of Rule 10b-5.223 As
such, they are less suited for use in the context of material conflicts of
interest. First, fiduciary duties require much work by the courts to figure
out when such duties actually attach.224 Second, breach of fiduciary
duties only implicates Rule 10b-5 and not the other disclosure
provisions of the securities laws.225 Third, a mere breach of fiduciary
duty is probably not enough to attach liability under Rule 10b-5 because
deception, omission or misrepresentation must also occur.226 As such
they leave investors with less causes of action than the alternative of
adding a disclosure requirement or exemption to the existing statutes.
Furthermore, it seems incongruous to provide investors and the SEC
with causes of action as remedies that relate only to fraud when a large
part of the issue is simple lack of disclosure by the party having the
conflict of interest.227 Third, a fiduciary duty addition to existing statutes
or regulations would likely not reflect the fact that Section 621 only
makes its prohibition for one year after the sale of the security in
question.228 Therefore, beyond that timeframe, this addition would
actually be more restrictive than Section 621, which limits itself to only
one year.229

223. See Alexander F. Loke, From the Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse: The
Changing Fabric of Insider Trading Law in the U.K., Australia and Singapore, 54 AM.
J. COMP. L. 123, 127 (2006) (“The ‘fraud’ requirement in Rule 10b-5 is . . . constituted
by fiduciaries dealing with the beneficiaries without full and proper disclosure.”).
224. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient?
Principles, Rules, and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710, 724-25 (2010)
(“Standards within fiduciary relationships are flexible, and courts can apply them as
they see fit in individual circumstances. As a result, it is difficult to make meaningful
generalizations describing fiduciary relationships, considering the diversity of contexts
in which they can arise.”).
225. See Loke, supra note 223, at 127 (explaining that 10b-5’s fraud requirement,
which is unique among securities laws, stems from fiduciary duties).
226. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-55 (1997).
227. Rule 10b-5 implicates fraud. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2009). On the other
hand, other securities laws, like Section 11 of the 1933 Act, do not implicate fraud. See
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006).
228. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111203, § 621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631-32 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a).
229. Id.
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4. Adding a Disclosure Exemption to The SEC’s Rule
Implementing Section 621 is the Most Effective Resolution
The best possible solution would be to add a disclosure exemption
to Section 621’s general prohibition that effectively requires structurers
and sellers of asset-backed securities to disclose their short positions on
such products and give investors access to all relevant underlying
information they have regarding the products. In effect, this is a
disclosure requirement because Section 621’s prohibition on material
conflicts of interest is left in place unless the disclosure exemption is
met. Disclosure in this form would be the most favorable solution
because it informs investors without unnecessarily restricting their
purchasing ability. It is consistent with the goals of the securities laws.230
It keeps structurers or sellers and buyers on equal footing while allowing
the market to price the affected securities accordingly.231 It recognizes
and respects that informed parties often have reasonable yet different
outlooks on certain investments regardless of who structured the
investments as well as divergent needs in terms of the risks they decide
to take.232 The implementation of a disclosure exemption could be
achieved in two different ways. First, Section 621 could be amended to
include a disclosure exemption. Second, SEC Rule 127B233, the SEC’s
rule regulating Section 621, could be implemented with a disclosure
exemption.234
Amending Section 621 to include a disclosure exemption is
unfavorable because it requires more action on Congress’s part.235 To
amend Section 621, now that it has been passed into law, would require
Congress to pass an additional law.236 This seems like a step backwards
and markedly more difficult than adding such an exemption to the SEC
Rule implementing Section 621, as described below. First, the SEC
would probably have to put its rule making on hold while Congress

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part VI.A.ii.
Id.
See SEC Proposed Rule 127B, supra note 14.
See infra note 239.
See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 288 (2011).
See id. (“An amendment to an existing statute is no less an act of the legislative
authority than a new, stand-alone statute.”) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
541 U.S. 369 (2004)).
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revisited Section 621.237 Second, Congress would have to have to agree
on proper language and garner enough votes to pass the amendment.238
Adding a disclosure exemption to SEC Rule 127B is within the
SEC’s authority and presents the most streamlined and effective process
for a solution. Under Section 28 of the Securities Act, the SEC has the
authority to create this exemption.239 Indeed, in proposing Rule 127B,
the SEC mentioned this authority in its discussion of a possible
disclosure exemption.240 SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes noted his
concern about the proposed rule’s lack of a role for disclosure, noting
that a role for disclosure would be consistent with the overall philosophy
of the securities laws and preventing the limitation of investor’s
choices.241 Having the agency that is in the process of studying
disclosure in this context, has ample experience drafting securitiesrelated rules and regulations, and will enforce the rule upon
implementation provides an advantage in terms of streamlining the
process of adding the disclosure exemption and making sure it is drafted

237. It seems axiomatic that a regulatory body would not waste its resources
drafting regulations for a statute that could be substantially altered. Cf. Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385,1426-28 (1992) (explaining that fear of judicial or congressional review may
dissuade agency decision makers from expending resources on drafting regulations they
feel will be disturbed in the review process).
238. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 288.
239. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2006) (“The [SEC], by rule or regulation, may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions
of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent
that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent
with the protection of investors.”).
240. See SEC Proposed Rule 127B, supra note 14, at 95-96.
241. See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose
Rule Amendments to Prohibit Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 19,
2011) (“I am concerned that, as proposed, Rule 127B does not incorporate a role for
disclosure. When a transaction or structure is banned, investors may find themselves
forced to forego investment opportunities that they might welcome if given the
opportunity to make an informed choice. One way to keep from sacrificing investor
choice in the context of this rulemaking could be to allow for proper disclosure to
redress what might otherwise be treated as a prohibited material conflict of interest.
Indeed, the tradition of the federal securities laws is one of disclosure whereby
investors are allowed to make investment decisions as they see fit with the benefit of
the information provided to them.”).
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appropriately.242 Finally, because disclosure is only as effective as its
timeliness, as recognized by the SEC,243 such an exemption should
contain guidance on the timeliness of disclosure and a clawback
provision for cases when the conflict occurs after the sale of the security
to the buyer.244
C. PROPOSED DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION IN SEC RULE 127B
The current draft of SEC Rule 127B is printed below.245 In bold is
this Comment’s proposed disclosure exemption and a clawback
provision accompanying it. The disclosure exemption requires
disclosure of both the material conflict of interest and raw data
underlying the security in question. It covers situations where the
covered party has an actual material conflict of interest and where such a
party intends to enter into any transaction where it would develop a
material conflict of interest. The clawback provision allows purchasers a
right to rescission of the affected security upon the development of a
material conflict on the part of any of the covered parties.
§ 230.127B CONFLICTS OF INTEREST RELATING TO CERTAIN
SECURITIZATIONS

(a) Unlawful activity. An underwriter, placement agent, initial
purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of
an asset-backed security (as such term is defined in section 3 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.C. [§] 78c), which for the
purposes of this rule shall include a synthetic asset-backed security),
shall not, at any time for a period ending on the date that is one year
after the date of the first closing of the sale of the asset- backed security,
engage in any transaction that would involve or result in any material

242. See generally Glen Staszeski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and
Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 901 (2012).
243. See SEC Proposed Rule 127B, supra note 14, at 90 n.131 (“[W]e note that
disclosure that is made subsequent to an [asset-backed security] transaction would not
be appropriate in managing conflicts of interests because an investor would have
already made an investment decision regarding whether or not to purchase the [assetbacked security].”).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a transaction arising
out of such activity.
(b) Excepted activity. The following activities shall not be
prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Risk-mitigating hedging activities. Risk-mitigating hedging
activities in connection with positions or holdings arising out of the
underwriting, placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of an assetbacked security, provided that such activities are designed to reduce the
specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or
sponsor associated with such positions or holdings; or
(2) Liquidity commitment. Purchases or sales of asset-backed
securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments of the
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any
affiliate or subsidiary of such entity, to provide liquidity for the assetbacked security; or
(3) Bona fide market-making. Purchases or sales of asset-backed
securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide marketmaking in the asset-backed security.
(4) Disclosure of Material Conflicts of Interest and Underlying
Information. Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities where the
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any
affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity discloses (1) its material
conflict of interest or intent to enter into a transaction that would create
a material conflict of interest; and (2) all raw information that it
possesses about the underlying assets.
(i) Clawback provision. Where the underwriter, placement agent,
initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of any such
entity enters into any transaction that would create a material conflict of
interest, that entity must disclose that material conflict of interest and all
raw information that it possesses about the underlying assets or offer the
buyer rescission of the affected security. Additionally, even if disclosure
is made in accordance with this provision, all buying parties in this
circumstance are entitled to rescission of the security upon their
election.

